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OBSCENITY RECONSIDERED:
BRINGING BROADCASTING INTO
THE MAINSTREAM COMMENTARY
ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN*
Twice in the past 100 years technology produced a fundamen-
tally new medium for transmitting speech. Motion pictures joined
the written word in the late 1890s and broadcasting joined these
media in the 1920s. The United States Supreme Court initially ex-
cluded each new medium from traditional First Amendment protec-
tion. In the 1915 case of Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission
of Ohio' the Court held that motion pictures did not deserve the
benefits of First Amendment press freedom. However, as early as
1943, in National Broadcasting Corp. v. United States' it held that
broadcasting's idiosyncratic nature" justified regulating the medium
under singular First Amendment principles. The Court then reversed
its earlier decision of Mutual Film in Burstyn v. Wilson' and granted
motion pictures full First Amendment rights. Only recently in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation' has the Court reaffirmed that broad-
casting is a singular medium warranting separate doctrinal treat-
ment.
The Court's view that broadcasting is qualitatively different
from the film and print media influenced decisions involving sexual
speech and broadcasting.' Court-developed obscenity principles ap-
ply with few exceptions jointly to the print and motion picture
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, Eastern Illinois University.
1. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). The
Court said, " . . . the exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and simple,
originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded .... as
part of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion." Id. at 244.
2. National Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
3. See text accompanying notes 20-31 infra.
4. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). The Court
recognized films as "a significant medium for the communication of ideas" and hence
part of First Amendment press because by 1952 newsreels and motion pictures con-
taining social and political messages showed that films did more than entertain. Id.
5. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Compare Red Lion Broad-
casting Corp. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (approving the fairness doctrine for broad-
casting), with Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down Florida's
"right to reply" statute).
6. It has also influenced the law on access. See Red Lion Broadcasting Corp.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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media;7 but the courts advance a different body of law governing
sexual speech in broadcasting. The differences warrant an analytical
distinction between "mainstream (or non-broadcasting) law" which
governs sexual speech in the print and motion picture media and
"broadcasting law" which governs sexuality in radio and television.
This bifurcation is echoed in the legal commentary: researchers tend
to focus on either mainstream or broadcasting law, or contrast the
two when they are discussed jointly.' As a result, most conclusions
7. The Court developed standards of obscenity control irrespective of the
medium through which the utterances were channeled. Definitive cases involved books:
A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58 (1963); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); magazines and
related publications: Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); films: Heller v.
New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); Lee Art
Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); and
theatrical performances: Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
See Powe, Cable and Obscenity, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 719, 723-24 (1975).
However, the Court apparently believes that a message portrayed visually is
more forceful than the same message transmitted through the written word. It has
said for example that "motion pictures possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly
among the youth of a community, than other modes of expression." Interstate Circuit,
Inc., v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968), quoting Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502
(1952). It also tacitly accepted the notion by affirming without comment a lower court
decision which said "[blecause of the nature of the medium we think a motion picture
of sexual scenes may transcend the bounds of the constitutional guarantee long before
a frank description of the same scenes in the written word." Fording v. Landau, 54
Cal. Rptr. 177, 181, aff'd per curiam, 388 US.. 456 (1967). See Powe, 24 CATH. U.L.
REV., supra, at 725. Finally, in Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), the
Court upheld a city ordinance requiring all films to be subject to review for obscenity.
A similar plan for books would presumably violate the First Amendment. See Boll-
inger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regula-
tion of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1976).
8. This is true of editors of standard casebooks. See, e.g., L. BARKER & T.
BARKER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (3d ed. 1978); R. CUSHMAN, CASES IN
CIVIL LIBERITES (2d ed. 1976); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND LIBERITES (4th ed. 1975). It is equally true of legal articles. See, e.g., Fahr-
inger & Brown, The Rise and Fall of Roth-A Critique of Recent Supreme Court
Obscenity Decisions, 62 Ky. L. REV. 731 (1974); Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of
Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First Amentment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533 (1975);
Rosenblum, The Judicial Politics of Obscenity, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1 (1975); Note,
Broadcasting Obscene Language: The Federal Communications Commission and Sec-
tion 1464 Violations, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 457; Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the
First Amendment, 61 VA. L. REV. 579 (1975); Note, Offensive Speech and the FCC, 79
YALE L.J. 1343 (1970); Comment, Miller v. California. A Cold Shower for the First
Amendment, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 568 (1974). With respect to narrative books, see,
e.g., H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT (3d ed. 1977); H. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1968). Finally it is similarly true for judicial and FCC decisions. See,
e.g., Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 32 RR2d 1331 (1975),
rev'd, Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969).
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about the status of sexual speech derive exclusively from
mainstream principles while broadcasting doctrine is either excluded
or merely footnoted as an aberration. The author of one otherwise
comprehensive book on obscenity, for example, noted only of broad-
casting that "the analysis of what can or cannot be permitted on the
airwaves is wholly unlike that for determining obscenity in other
contexts."'
An accurate analysis of sexual speech requires integration of
broadcasting into the mainstream commentary. The incorporation of
broadcasting prompts changes in the law relating to sexual speech,
changes that indicate a less vigorous system of free expression than
that revealed when only mainstream media are considered. The arti-
cle first suggests that the reasons broadcasting law has traditionally
been discussed separately from mainstream law are unpersuasive. It
then proposes a restatement of current legal standards governing
sexual speech in light of broadcasting law. It includes both sub-
stantive and procedural standards of mainstream doctrine and
broadcasting doctrine, and the integration of the two in a restated
collective standard. It concludes with a discussion of the effect main-
streaming has on the analysis of free expression.
EXPLAINING BROADCASTING NEGLECT IN
MAINSTREAM COMMENTARY
Commentary on sexual speech traditionally excludes broad-
casting for three apparent reasons. Each has merit but none
justifies separating broadcasting from the analysis of sexual speech.
First, at least until FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,0 broadcasting prin-
ciples were largely the result of FCC practices and lower federal
court decisions.11 On the other hand, the Supreme Court produced
the bulk of mainstream law.12 The Court decided dozens of main-
9. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 190 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
SCHAUER].
10. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
11. See, e.g., Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 32
RR2d 1331 (1975). rev'd Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (1977), rev'd FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); In re Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41
F.C.C.2d 919, 27 RR2d 285 (1973), affd sub. nom., Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broad-
casting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Eastern Educational Radio (WUHY-FM),
24 F.C.C.2d 408, 18 RR2d 860 (1970); Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d
833, affd on rehearing 24 F.C.C.2d 266 (1970); Palmetto Broadcasting Corp., 33 F.C.C.
250 (1962), rehearing denied, 34 F.C.C. 101 (1963), affd sub. nom., Robinson v. FCC, 334
F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
12. Key decisions in the evolving definition of obscenity include Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscene material appeals to prurient interests, is patent-
ly offensive, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value, as decided
1980]
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stream obscenity cases after it began to review sexual speech
in 195718 but its first broadcasting decision came not until 1978.
However, the Court's detachment from broadcasting doctrine is not
as severe as it first appears considering the 1943 decision of Na-
tional Broadcasting Corp. v. United States." That decision upheld
the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 which allowed the
airwaves to be used only in the "public interest" and granted the
FCC enforcement powers primarily by means of its control over
broadcast licenses." This case gave the FCC enormous discretion in
its decisions of what speech was not in the public interest and re-
quired only that the FCC could not revoke or deny a license
"capriciously."'7 The decision makes the Supreme Court at least par-
tially responsible for FCC treatment of sexual speech.
Second, commentators tend to assume that sexual censorship in
broadcasting is not a serious problem. Indeed, very few cases involv-
ing censorship appear in FCC and Federal Reporters. 8 Yet the
absence of overt censorship does not preclude a constitutional prob-
lem. More than one observer has suggested that the FCC exercises
subtle pressures that cause licensees to censor themselves. 9 If self-
censorship does indeed result from FCC intimidation, then more
by community standards); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (a book which is patently offensive and
appeals to prurient interests is not obscene if it has "a modicum of literary and
historical value"); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (material may be held
obscene if it is crudely and offensively marketed [i.e., "pandered"]); Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184 (1964) (material must be utterly without social importance to be obscene);
Manual Enterprises, Inc., v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (material must be "patently offen-
sive" as well as appealing to prurient interests to be obscene); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957) (something is obscene if, "to the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole ap-
peals to prurient interests").
13. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
14. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
15. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(1)(D) and § 308(a) (1976).
17. 319 U.S. at 226-27. This contrasted with other decisions of the 1940s in
which the Court suggested that statutory limitations on speech were presumptively
unconstitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Congress of Indus. Organizations, 335 U.S.
106, 121 n.20 (1948); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1943); and Schneider v.
New Jersey, 309 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
18. See, e.g., note 11 supra. Part of the reason for infrequent censorship is
that licensees shun controversial material in order to avoid antagonizing what they
perceive to be a sedate audience. See Powe, 24 CATH. U. L. REV., supra note 7.
19. See, e.g., Note, 61 VA. L. REV., supra note 8, at 606, 611. For a discussion
of these pressures, see text accompanying notes 175-91 infra.
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rather than less First Amendment vigilance may be required to guard
against the chilling effect.
Third, unique aspects of broadcasting cause many to view it
apart from mainstream media."' Unlike other media, the argument
goes, broadcasting depends upon scarce natural resources and is
"uniquely pervasive in the lives of all Americans."" Yet arguably
these features are shared with other media as well. Consider first
broadcasting's resource scarcity: television and radio operate via an
electromagnetic spectrum made up of individual frequencies that are
limited in number, thus limiting public accessibility.' In order to
deal with this "scarcity," Congress declared the electromagnetic
spectrum a public resource and the FCC the agency for allocating
licenses in the Radio Communications Act of 1927 and its successor,
the Communications Act of 1934. As the Court said in National
Broadcasting Corp. v. United States: "Unlike other modes of expres-
sion, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its unique
characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it
is subject to governmental regulation."" In contrast, traditional
media rely on abundant natural resources. Film, processing equip-
ment, paper, and printing presses exist in abundance, subject only
to financial limitations, and thus need not be allocated on a public in-
terest basis.
Yet public accessibility to the traditional media is also limited.
Although in theory the materials upon which they rely are freely
available and these media can be used by anyone, in practice cor-
porate monopolization limits access to print and other non-broadcast
media.' Today, only one or two newspapers serve most cities; in
fact, only three cities have more than two independently owned com-
peting papers. In approximately 64 cities two independent news-
papers operate and 141 cities have two newspapers with the same
owner.' Causes may differ, but scarcity of opportunity is present to
some degree in all media. The newspaper is but one example. Broad-
20. See, e.g, SCHAUER supra note 8, at 190.
21. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748.
22. There are two forms of accessibility. One refers to openness of the
marketplace and is measured by the ability of individuals to set up a business within
the industry. A second refers to the ability of interested individuals and groups to
penetrate the media to publicize their views.
23. 319 U.S. at 226.
24. Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for the Electronic
and Print Media, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 659, 684-85 (1975).
25. Id.
1980]
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casting's relative impenetrability is not unique; rather it arises in
different circumstances."
Broadcasting's "uniquely pervasive presence" is another endur-
ing myth. Broadcast material is received in the most private of con-
texts-the home.' It poses the danger of unwittingly exposing the
listeners sitting in the sanctity of their homes to unacceptable
speech while scanning the dial in search of a program.28 More impor-
tantly, broadcasting is alleged to be "uniquely accessible to
children,"' especially by parents who have trouble controlling what
their children watch on television or hear over the radio. Although
television and radio are arguably "intruders"' threatening adult and
child with involuntary exposure, this does not make them unique.
Broadcasting's "dial scanner" has a cohort in the print arena-the
''page turner." The dial scanner switches stations in the privacy of
the home; the page turner leafs through a magazine, newspaper, or
book. In both cases the recipient "opened up" his or her home by an act
of free will, on the one hand by purchasing a publication and on the
other by turning on the television or radio set. In both cases the "in-
vasion" of privacy could be ended instantly. 1
In summary, exclusion of broadcast speech from analysis of
sexual speech control in other media is unjustified. Contrary to the
assertion that broadcasting law is purely that of the FCC and lower
courts, National Broadcasting Corp., which gave the FCC broad
26. Ironically, as the traditional media have become less penetrable, cable
television makes telecommunications more penetrable. Cable television uses a coaxial
cable rather than common airwaves to transmit signals to home television sets. It is
not bound by the limited number of airwave frequencies and "can be expanded virtual-
ly without bound by adding more lines to the coaxial cable." Note, The Limits of
Broadcast Self-Regulation Under the First Amendment, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1527, 1542
n.67 (1975). It has been estimated that for every channel available through the air-
waves, 80 are available through a single cable. Note, Cable Television and Content
Regulation: The FCC, the First Amendment and the Electronic Newspaper, 51
N.Y.U.L. REV. 133, 135 (1976).
27. For the importance of home privacy see, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
556 F.2d 9, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728
(1970); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
28. See In re Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 RR2d 285, 288 (1973); and
WUHY-FM, 18 RR2d 860, 864, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 411 (1970). But see Pacifica Foundation,
56 F.C.C.2d 94, 32 RR2d 1331 (1975).
29. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 749.
30. Id.
31. The Court suggested looking away to avoid offensive material in Erzoz-
nick v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975) (nudity on an outdoor movie screen) and
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (a man in a courthouse wearing a jacket on
which "Fuck the draft" was written).
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power over speech in 1943, indicates a long history of Supreme Court
imprimatur. Second, the few cases of broadcast censorship should
not cloak the possibility that a deeper, less visible form of censor-
ship is still going on. Third, broadcasting is not as different from
other media as might first appear. To be sure, broadcasting is
dependent on scarce natural resources and it is inaccessible to aspir-
ing entrepreneurs. It does enter the privacy of the home and it can
unexpectedly offend the audience. But traditional media are also ef-
fectively closed to many would-be entrepreneurs. Similarly they, as
well as broadcasting, can assault the sensibilities of their audiences
in the privacy of the home. To isolate broadcasting from mainstream
media on the grounds that it is "unique" overstates the argument. A
potent word, used to denote one of a kind or something for which
there is no equal, "unique" is overused in everday language. It is
also misused in broadcasting, erroneously depicting a medium with
characteristics unshared by other media. More accurately, the media
can be said to fall on a continuum with variations of accessibility,
the likelihood of unwanted exposure in the home, and the danger of
surreptitious viewing by children. Thus the media are understood
better through gradations than typologies. Their similarities suggest
that their separate bodies of law may profitably be studied jointly.
SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS GOVERNING
THE CONTROL OF SEXUAL SPEECH
Mainstream Standard
The mainstream standard for controlling sexual speech re-
volves around obscenity. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire82 the
Court suggested that obscene utterances were not speech within the
meaning of the First Amendment:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
has never been thought to raise any Constitutional pro-
blem. These include the lewd and the obscene, the pro-
fane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of peace.3
Chaplinsky created two classes of utterances: higher level speech
within the scope of First Amendment protections and lower level
expression technically not First Amendment "speech" at all.
32. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
33. 315 U.S. at 572.
1980]
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Chaplinsky's definitional exclusion of certain expressions from the
realm of protected speech reflected the Court's assumptions about
the nature and meaning of speech. To qualify as speech, utterances
must contribute to society's edification. As Mr. Justice Murphy con-
tinued in Chaplinsky, "it has been well observed that such ut-
terances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality."3 The Court's pioneering obscenity decision of
Roth v. United States 5 recast Chaplinsky's "two-level" principle"' in-
to ratio decedendi, at least for that part of Chaplinsky dealing with
obscenity. Roth reiterated that "obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press" because it is devoid of
social utility.3 '
Definitions are essential to the Chaplinsky-Roth two-level ap-
proach. The approach uses obscenity as a signpost to direct pro-
tected speech to one avenue and non-protected utterances to
another. To be effective the two-level approach needs a clearly
displayed waymark or definition. The Court has had trouble clearly
defining obscenity and it failed to reach a majority agreement on a
definition in the first ten years after Roth.38 Failing this it essential-
ly shelved the question by writing a series of short per curiam opi-
nions when faced with the issue." Miller v. California" finally broke
34. Id.
35. 354 U.S. 476 (1957), decided along with Alberts v. California. The Court
granted certiorari in an earlier sexual speech case, Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 509
(1948), but a tie vote prevented it from contributing to the doctrine developing in
lower courts. See SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 30.
36. The "two-level" appellation was added by Kalven, The Metaphysics of the
Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 9-11.
37. 354 U.S. at 485.
38. In Roth it defined material as obscene if, "to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interests." 354 U.S. at 489. The key cases in the next 10
years are listed in note 12, supra. In three of these decisions- "Memoirs" v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); and Manual
Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962)-the Justices failed to agree on an opinion
for the Court.
39. In Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967), the Court summarized the
different views on obscenity set forth by the Justices and then, in reversing the
obscenity convictions of a newsstand dealer and two other persons, said: "[w]hichever
of these constitutional views is brought to bear upon the cases before us, it is clear
that the judgments cannot stand." Id. at 771. In Redrup and the 35 obscenity convic-
tions summarily reversed on its basis in the next two years, the Justices concluded
that the material in question was not obscene but they offered no common definition of
obscenity. See Fahringer & Brown, 62 Ky. L. REV., supra note 8, at 734-35.
40. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
41. Id., at 24.
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the impasse in 1973 when the Burger Court sifted through past deci-
sions and arrived at the current working definition of obscenity:
material is obscene if, as judged by the average person using con-
temporary community standards, it (1) appeals as a whole to sexual
prurient interests, (2) is patently offensive, and (3) taken as a whole,
lacks "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.""
As the Court labored from Roth to Miller it moved between
two approaches for defining obscenity. Roth approximated what
Lockhart and McClure call "constant obscenity," an approach that
presumes material diagnosed as obscene in one context will be
obscene in every other context.'2 It draws a rigid line between pro-
tected and unprotected expression and focuses attention on the
material itself. It disregards the context in which the material is
read or viewed and does not balance the material with other social
interests. For example, the Roth Court declined to consider whether
the material in question-an assortment of magazines and leaflets
sent through the mails-would "create a clear and present danger of
antisocial conduct."'" Using the constant obscenity approach the
Court based its decision on facial obscenity and declined to weigh
contextual factors.
After Roth the Court moved to what Lockhart and McClure
call "variable obscenity.""' Under this approach the Court considers
the material's context as well as its content in deciding whether to
allow controls. Variable obscenity has taken different forms. One re-
quires the Court to set up a ladder of obscenity definitions and ap-
ply one depending on the audience to be reached. In Mishkin v.
New York'5 the Court held that material directed to a deviant group
is obscene if it appeals to the prurient interests of that group.
Mishkin used the average adult homosexual rather than the average
adult of the whole community to define obscenity. In Ginsberg v.
New York" the Court concluded that a different standard of obsceni-
ty might apply when children compose the target audience. This
form of variable obscenity is loyal to Chaplinsky and Roth because
each definition repeats the two-level principle that obscenity is not
protected while other material is. The Court brings context into the
picture only to decide which definition is appropriate.
42. Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitu-
tional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 68-88 (1960). See also Schauer, The Return of
Variable Obscenity? 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1277 n.16 (1977).
43. 354 U.S. at 486.
44. Lockhart & McClure, 45 MINN. L. REV., supra note 42, at 68-88.
45. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
46. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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A second form of variable obscenity veers further from
Chaplinsky and Roth by using context at the onset to decide
whether material is obscene. In Ginzburg v. United States," the
Court held that the way a publication is advertised and sold may
contribute to its obscenity. If material is "pandered," that is crudely
and offensively marketed so as to appeal to the salacious interests
of the targeted public, this marketing tactic may be enough to tip
the scales to obscenity. Similarly, in Stanley v. Georgia" the Court
held that the privacy of the home protected the owner's right to
possess material otherwise subject to sanctions for obscenity. Both
Ginzburg and Stanley introduced a flexible line between obscene
and nonobscene material.
A third form is suggested by Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc. 9 in which four members of the Court agreed with Mr.
Justice Stevens' position that "there is surely a less vital interest in
the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline be-
tween pornography and artistic expression than in the free
dissemination of ideas of social and political significance."5' The deci-
sion upheld Detroit's zoning ordinances requiring geographical
dispersion of "adult theaters" (those emphasizing specified sexual ac-
tivities and specified anatomical areas) as reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions. The decision let stand an ordinance that
distinguished theaters on the basis of the content of material they
exhibited. In a section in which only three members of the Court
joined, Justice Stevens elaborated on his view that speech could be
controlled on the basis of its content and that some erotic speech
was inherently less deserving of First Amendment protection."' The
decision opened the possibility that the Court might create a grada-
tion of sexual speech, with obscene utterances not protected, sexual-
ly explicit speech somewhat protected, and other speech fully pro-
tected. However, the decision contrasts with other Court decisions'
and it is yet unclear whether Young presages a new direction in
Court doctrine.
In summary, the mainstream standard casts obscene material
outside of First Amendment protection and protects all other sexual
47. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
48. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
49. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
50. 427 U.S. at 61.
51. He said, among other things, that "few of us would march our sons and
daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities'
exhibited in the theaters of our choice." 427 U.S. at 70.
52. See, e.g., Erzoznick v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 215 (1975). Dissenting in
Young, Mr. Justice Stewart called the decision an "aberration." 427 U.S. at 87.
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speech. However the line the Court erects between obscene and
nonobscene speech is no longer as rigid as the one set up in Chaplin-
sky and Roth. The Court now recognizes different definitions of
obscenity, uses contextual variables to decide whether material is
obscene, and has indicated that sexually explicit speech may be sub-
ject to more controls than other sexual speech. Yet the line is
distinct enough to bar the state from prohibiting such things as
"lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile" material." At heart, the
mainstream standard is designed to root out obscenity only.
The Broadcasting Standard
The standard sexual speech must meet in broadcasting differs
in three ways from the mainstream standard: it defines obscenity
differently, it controls indecent speech, and it regulates speech not
thought to be in the public interest.
1. Obscenity
Section 1464 of Title 18 in the Criminal Code makes it illegal to
broadcast obscene language." The Justice Department is empowered
to bring criminal action against stations for broadcasting obscene
language' and likewise the Communications Act allows the FCC to
revoke a station's license," issue a cease and desist order,57 or im-
pose a forfeiture" on any station broadcasting obscenity. The
Justice Department has prosecuted on at least four occasions for
obscene broadcasts59 and the FCC recently imposed a forfeiture on
53. The Court has held that only obscene materials may be proscribed under
a federal statute barring the mailing of any "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy
or vile" item. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), upholding 18 U.S.C. § 1461
(1976). This left "lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile" as "mere surplusage."
SCHAUER. supra note 9, at 173. The Court also held that only obscene materials may be
forbidden under a federal statute barring the use of a common carrier for the in-
terstate and foreign transport of any "obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy" item. United
States v. Orito, 413 U.S 139 (1973), upholding 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1976). It denied cer-
tiorari in a case in which a federal court held that only obscene material may be barred
under a provision of the federal code forbidding the interstate shipment of any
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy" material. United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583
(2d Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971), interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1463 (1976).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976): "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned not more than two years, or both."
55. See Note, 61 VA. L. REV., supra note 8, at 591.
56. 47 U.S.C. § 312 (a)(1976).
57. 47 U.S.C. § 312 (b)(2)(1976).
58. 47 U.S.C. § 503 (b)(1)(E)(1976)
59. United States v. Smith, 467 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1972); Tallman v. United
States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972); Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.
1980]
Bonnicksen: Obscenity Reconsidered: Bringing Broadcasting into the Mainstream
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
272 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 14
Sonderling Corporation for the obscene broadcasts of one of its sta-
tions."' The agencies involved in the interpretation of Section 1464
define obscenity differently from the Supreme Court's definition for
mainstream media. Inasmuch as the FCC is apparently taking on
new responsibility in the enforcement of Section 1464,1 it is ap-
propriate to focus on its definition of obscenity.
Sonderling Broadcasting Corp.2 represents the FCC's most
complete treatment of obscenity. At issue in the case were "Femme
Forum" radio programs aired by a Chicago licensee of the Sonder-
ling Corporation. The programs were broadcast in the daytime,
directed at housewives, and dealt explicitly with sex. In response to
listener complaints," the FCC singled out as targets two programs
containing explicit descriptions of oral sex." The FCC issued a
Notice of Apparent Liability' to Sonderling Corporation, concluding
that the broadcasts were obscene. It proposed a $2000 forfeiture as
authorized by the Communications Act."
The FCC issued this Notice just prior to Miller v. California's
restatement of obscenity standards. 7 The FCC claimed that its
obscenity finding followed the then prevailing standards of Roth v.
United States," A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a
1966); Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 863 (1931).
See Note, 61 VA. L. REV., supra note 8, at 591 n.97.
60. In re Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 RR2d 285, recon. denied, 41 FCC
2d 777 (1973), affd sub. nom., Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515
F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
61. The FCC's recent involvement stems from hearings by the Senate Com-
munications Subcommittee in December, 1969, to the effect that the FCC should play a
more active role in sanctioning broadcast obscenity. See Note, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J.,
supra note 8, at 457-58.
62. In re Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 RR2d 285, recon. denied, 41
FCC2d 777 (1973), affd sub. nom., Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515
F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
63. The shows had also been met with listener approval. See Illinois Citizens
Comm. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
64. For a description of the questionable procedures carried out by the FCC
in this case see text accompanying notes 163-74 infra.
65. As required by 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(E) (1976) and 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)
(1976).
66. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(E) (1976): "Any licensee or permittee of a broadcast
station who violates section .. . 1464 of title 18, shall forfeit to the United States a
sum not to exceed $1,000. Each day during which such violation occurs shall constitute
a separate offense." The FCC proposed a $2,000 forfeiture because the two programs
spanned a period of two days.
67. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) See text accompanying note 41, supra.
68. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,9 and Ginzburg v. United
States." Femme Forum, the commissioners concluded, was obscene
because it was "patently offensive to community standards for
broadcast matter" and was "pandered" by the radio announcer." But
FCC claims to the contrary, the definition differed from the
mainstream standard.7 2
The FCC's conclusions differed in essentially four ways. First,
the FCC based its decision on a 22-minute excerpt extracted from 61
hours of taped programs. 78 Evidence showed the FCC failed to listen
to the full radio programs. This differed from Roth's requirement
that the material be taken as a whole in order to determine its
obscenity. Second, the FCC failed to identify the community upon
which its decision was based, thereby indicating it used its own
standards. This differed from the mainstream use of community
standards. 7' Third, the FCC failed to consider any possible redeem-
ing social value of the Femme Forum programs. This diverged from
the Memoirs stipulation that material must be "utterly without
redeeming social value" to be obscene.7 5 Fourth, the FCC misapplied
Ginzburg's admittedly obscure pandering test. Ginzburg provided
that judges may take the method of sale into account in deciding
whether borderline material is obscene. Material commercially
foisted upon the audience with the "leer of the sensualist"' may tip
the material to the sphere of the obscene. However, the FCC used
the pandering test on material that was not even borderline
obscene. Moreover, it failed to establish factually that the an-
nouncer's comments were "pandering" as defined in Ginzburg," and
it used pandering in reference to two statements in the 22-minute
excerpt, contrary to Ginzburg's principle that pandering apply to
the entire presentation of the material.
The Sonderling Corporation elected to pay the forfeiture rather
than assume the anticipated "tremendous financial burden" of an ap-
69. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
70. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
71. In re Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 RR2d 285, 289 (1973).
72. This discussion relies upon Chief Judge Bazelon's statement explaining
why he voted to grant a rehearing en banc, Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v.
FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 407-25 (D.C. Cir. 1975), and FCC Commissioner Johnson's remarks
in News Release of Sonderling, 41 F.C.C.2d 919 (1973).
73. 515 F.2d 397, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
74. See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 9, at 119 n.19.
75. 383 U.S. at 419-20.
76. 383 U.S. at 468.
77. See 515 F.2d at 420 n.51. Chief Judge Bazelon claimed the FCC's conclu-
sion that the anouncer resorted to "leering innuendo" was "gross exaggeration" Id.
19801
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peal. At that point two citizens' groups representing the listening
audience took over the appeal" but were met by a district court's af-
firmation of the FCC's finding."9 In so ruling the court offered a new
definition of obscenity. This definition too veered from the mainstream
definition, which by this time was based on Miller v. California.8
First, the court failed to consider the Femme Forum programs as a
whole despite Miller's reaffirmation of this principle. Basing its deci-
sion on the same 22-minute excerpt used by the FCC, the court
argued that the "episodic" nature of broadcasting justified using on-
ly portions of the material as evidence. The court took "episodic" to
mean the programs were "a cluster of individual and typically
disconnected commentaries, rather than an integrated presentation,"
and were commonly heard in "short snatches" by listeners.8 Second,
the court allowed the FCC to substitute its own standards for those
of the community despite Miller's position that local community
standards may guide the determination of obscenity." The court also
concluded that the material made "no literary, political, or scientific
contribution," thus deviating from Miller's position that material
must lack "serious" social value to be obscene. In addition, the
FCC's faulty application of Ginzburg's pandering criterion was ac-
cepted by the court which observed that the "pervasive pandering
approach makes the broadcast pornographic even though some of its
elements may be unoffensive." Finally, the court declined to apply
Miller's new requirement that sexual speech be controlled only
under a state law specifically defining obscenity."
78. The groups, the Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting and the Il-
linois chapter of the ACLU, filed an Application for Remission of the Forfeiture and a
Petition for Reconsideration with the FCC. See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcast-
ing v. FCC, 515 F.2d at 401. The FCC refused to reconsider, 41 F.C.C.2d 777 (1973),
whereupon the groups took their claims to the United States District Court. In re
Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 RR2d 285 (1973), affd sub. nom., Illinois Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
79. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
80. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC,
515 F.2d 397, 407-25 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
81. 515 F.2d at 406.
82. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S.
153 (1974); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973).
83. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), specified that obscenity must be
specifically defined by state law "as written or authoritatively construed." The
Sonderling court noted that this provision of Miller had not been raised in the present
case and that, in any event, "Miller's specificity requirement [was) designed to 'provide
fair notice to a dealer"' and need not be raised for a group appealing on behalf of a
broadcasting corporation. 515 F.2d at 405.
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In summary, authoritative bodies in almost all cases regulating
broadcast obscenity use a definition, if indeed one is offered, that
differs from the mainstream standard. As defined in the recent
Sonderling Corp. case, broadcast material may be held to be obscene
even if it is not taken as a whole, its social value is not appraised,
and the local audience is not used to assess its pruriency. Inasmuch
as Section 1464, the basis of liability, proscribes simply "obscene"
material, not a qualified version such as "obscene as defined for
broadcasting," the peculiar definition of obscenity in broadcasing
lacks clear statutory authority.
2. Indecent Language
Section 1464 of Title 18 prohibits the broadcast of indecent
language." The Justice Department and the FCC enforced this pro-
vision for several years in the absence of a clear definition of in-
decency. 5 The first authoritative definition of indecency came in the
case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation." As defined by the appellate
court and upheld by the Supreme Court, indecency includes "patent-
ly offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and ac-
tivities."87 A station broadcasting indecent language is subject to
license revocation," a cease and desist order," or a monetary
forfeiture."
Pacifica Foundation involved a 22-minute excerpt from a
George Carlin recording aired by a New York radio station in con-
nection with a discussion of contemporary language. In the excerpt
entitled "Filthy Words," Carlin repeatedly uttered several graphic
words. A New York City listener who had heard the broadcast while
driving with his son complained to the FCC. 1 In response the Com-
84. Supra note 54. The lower courts have long upheld FCC insistence that
obscene and indecent expressions are, for regulatory purposes, distinguishable. See,
e.g., Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720, 725 (9th Cir. 1966); and United States v.
Smith, 467 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court upheld this distinction in FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 744-48.
85. As late as 1977 a federal court was still able to note that "the term inde-
cent has never been authoritatively construed by the courts in connection with section
1464." Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
86. Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI-(FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 32 RR2d 1331
(1975), rev'd Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
87. 438 U.S. at 743.
88. 47 U.S.C. § 312 (a)(1976).
89. 47 U.S.C. § 312 (b)(2)(1976).
90. 47 U.S.C. § 503 (b)(1)(E)(1976).
91. The man argued in his complaint that "[any child could have been turning
the dial, and tuned in to that garbage." Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 95 (1975).
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mission issued a Declaratory Order barring indecent language, defined
as that which "describes, in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards for the broadcasting medium,
sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when
there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience."" It
mentioned seven "patently offensive" words in particular." The FCC
indicated it would use a different test at night when children were
less likely to be listening, one which would consider the literary, ar-
tistic, political or scientific value of the material."" The FCC claimed
it was not censoring material but instead was "channeling" offensive
speech to times of the day when the fewest children would be listen-
ing.9
5
The Order's immediate effect was to bar the station from air-
ing specified indecent language. But it had broader implications for
the station, inasmuch as the FCC said it would associate the order
with the station's license file and place on record the fact that the
station owner could have received administrative sanctions for
broadcasting indecent language in violation of Section 1464. This
opened the possibility that the FCC would refer to the order at
license renewal time. Consequently, the Pacifica Foundation ruling
directly tied indecency with an administrative sanction.
The Pacifica Foundation, which owned the licensee, appealed the
ruling. Shortly thereafter the FCC attempted to narrow its definition by
saying that it would not hold the licensee responsible if indecent words
were broadcast "as part of a bona fide news or public affairs program"
or were aired live.' Nevertheless the Circuit Court reversed the FCC's
order on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague
and violated the First Amendment." It held that the order "inhibited
92. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975). The FCC did not impose
direct sanctions on the station and instead used the Order as a forum for clarifying the
meaning of indecency under 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976). The FCC did, however, associate
the Order with WBAI's license file, noting that "in the event that subsequent com-
plaints are received, the Commission will then decide whether it should utilize any of
the available sanctions it has been granted by Congress." Id. at 99.
93. The words were "fuck," "shit," "piss," "motherfucker," "cocksucker,"
"cunt," and "tit." Id. at 99.
94. Id. at 97. The Commission denied it was censoring material in violation of
47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976).
95. Id. at 99-100. The commission borrowed the channeling principle from
nuisance law.
96. In re "Petition for Clarification or Reconsideration" of a Citizen's Com-
plaint against Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI (FM), 36 RR2d 1008, 1010 (1976). The
FCC issued the clarification in response to the Petition for Clarification or Recon-
sideration.
97. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 14
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1980], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol14/iss2/2
19801 OBSCENITY RECONSIDERED
the free and robust exchange of ideas" and amounted to censorship in
violation of Section 326 of the Communications Act." Because the court
disposed of the case on the basis of Section 326 it declined comment on
the FCC's definition of indecency although it did hold that the broad-
casts were not obscene and were therefore entitled to First Amendment
protection.
The FCC appealed the ruling whereupon the Supreme Court re-
versed," holding first that the FCC order did not amount to censorship
in violation of Section 326 of the Communications Act and second that
the order was not overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. The
Court then specifically upheld Section 1464's indecency provision,
thereby rejecting Pacifica Foundation's claim that the state may forbid
only obscenity. The Court also affirmed the FCC's definition of in-
decency as "patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs
and activities."'' 10 The Court argued that indecency may be controlled in
broadcasting because of the medium's unique characteristics.' Stating
that "we have long recognized that each medium of expression presents
special First Amendment problems,"'' 2 the Court reiterated that "of all
forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most
limited First Amendment protection."'' 0 3
98. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976):
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Com-
mission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be
promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the
right of free speech by means of radio communications.
99. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). The vote was five to four,
with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Powell in
the majority and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stewart dissenting.
100. Id. at 1089. With this definition the Court offered the first authoritative
definition of indecency under 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976). See supra note 85. In earlier
cases courts had based their rulings on other grounds and had thereby not offered nar-
rowing constructions of Section 1464. See, e.g., Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9
(1977) (reversing an FCC determination of indecency but without offering a substantive
definition); United States v. Smith, 467 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1972) (overturning a convic-
tion for violating Section 1464 on the grounds that the jury should have been given a
definition of indecency but was not); and Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th
Cir. 1966) (holding that the jury should have been but was not given a definition of in-
decency in a trial involving language broadcast over a citizen's band radio).
Lacking judicial guidance, the FCC developed its own definition of indecency. In
WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 413 (1970), for example, it defined indecent language as
that which is "(a) patently offensive by contemporary community standards; and (b) is
utterly without redeeming social value."
101. 438 U.S. at 748. Specifically, the Court mentioned the "uniquely pervasive
presence" of broadcasting and its easy accessibility to children.
102. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748, citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-503 (1952).
103. 438 U.S. at 748.
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The Court's opinion by Mr. Justice Stevens has several implications
for the regulation of sexual speech. First, this case represents an exten-
sion of thought begun by Mr. Justice Stevens in Young v. American
Mini Theatres.""4 In Young the Court condemned sexually explicit ma-
terial on its face, indicating that it was qualitatively less desirable
than other speech and might be subject to greater regulation on
that basis alone. In Pacifica Foundation Mr. Justice Stevens took up
the same theme in a section in which only two other members con-
curred."'6 Calling the seven dirty words "vulgar," "offensive," and
"shocking," he said that they were "not entitled to absolute constitu-
tional protection under all circumstances."' " Young and Pacifica
Foundation contrast to the Court's usual position that sexual speech
will be controlled for the danger it poses to society'" and only
obscenity may be controlled on its face. Each decision affirms that
other forms of sexual speech may also be controlled on their face.
Second, the Court set up a variable standard of indecency within
broadcasting analogous to the variable standard of obscenity in
mainstream media. Rather than offering one definition of indecency
and stating that all indecency was forbidden in broadcasting, the
Court suggested that indecent words might be permitted if used
occasionally rather than repeatedly, in the evening rather than the
daytime, or on closed circuit transmissions. 8 Thus, the concept of
variable indecency might be added to Lockhart and McClure's con-
cept of variable obscenity. The Court's decision not to set forth a
constant standard conforms with its movement from Roth's two-
level model and toward a more graduated treatment of sexual
speech.
3. Language Not in the Public Interest
The Communications Act of 1934 gives the FCC broad power
over licensing. A license is the radio or television station's life force
and the FCC has power to grant, suspend, deny it or grant only a
short-term license renewal.'" The FCC may use its licensing power
104. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
105. Justices Blackmun and Powell. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist declined to join Justice Stevens in this section of the opinion.
106. 438 U.S. at 474-78.
107. See, e.g. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1973); and Rosenfeld v. New
Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
108. 438 U.S. at 750.
109. The FCC may suspend the license of any licensee if it is established that
the licensee "has transmitted .. . profane or obscene words, language, or meaning...."
47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(1)(D) (1976). The FCC, "if public convenience, interest, or necessity will
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to sanction licensees who fail to broadcast in the name of "public
convenience, interest, or necessity" providing it does not censor in
violation of Section 326 of the Communications Act. " ' Despite the
anti-censorship provision of Section 326 the FCC has used the public
interest criterion to sanction stations broadcasting material not
found to be either indecent or obscene. Two cases illustrate.
In Palmetto Broadcasting Corp."' the FCC denied a license
renewal to a radio station after concluding the station had broadcast
"coarse, vulgar, suggestive" language that was capable of "indecent
double meaning,1 1 2 but based its decision on the fact that the
licensee misrepresented his knowledge of the broadcasts to the
FCC."1 The FCC emphasized that its decision not to renew could
stand on the misrepresentation point alone."" The Court of Appeals
upheld the ruling on that basis as well."' Although the decision was
based on technical grounds, the FCC's hostility to the sexual content
of the broadcasts in question pervaded its opinion. The district
court's decision not to review the FCC's finding of vulgarity left
unclear the standards under which the FCC applies the public in-
terest criterion. The FCC's failure to specify what in the programs
was offensive magnified the uncertainty. It only referred to one ex-
ample: the airing of "the suggestive term, 'let it all hang out' three
times.""..
In Jack Straw Memorial Foundation"7 the FCC granted only a
short-term license renewal to a Seattle radio station after con-
cluding that the station had broadcast language in violation of its
own policy against airing "obscenity, obscurantism, sensationalism,
or simple'boorishness.. ' .8 Again claiming that it based its decision on
a technical point, the FCC failed to discuss the nature of the
material in question. But in order to conclude that the station
violated its own policy the FCC had to conclude at least implicitly
that the station in fact aired obscene, obscure, sensational or boorish
be served thereby .... shall grant to any applicant therefor a station license.... 47 U.S.C.
§ 307(a) (1979). The FCC may grant a "renewal of such license ... from time to time for a
term of not to exceed three years... if the Commission finds that public interest, conven-
ience, or necessity would be served thereby." 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1976).
110. See note 98 supra.
111. Palmetto Broadcasting Corp., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962).
112. Id., at 257.
113. Id., at 251.
114. Id., at 258.
115. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
116. Palmetto Broadcasting Corp., 33 F.C.C. 250, 253 n.3 (1962).
117. Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d 833 (1970).
118. See Note, 61 VA. L. REV., supra note 8, at 609.
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material. By not specifying standards for reaching this decision the
FCC again loosely used the public interest criterion to sanction sex-
ual speech.
In summary, the FCC's power over licensing in the name of the
public interest allows it to control speech that is demonstrably not
obscene or indecent. Although Palmetto and Jack Straw penalized
stations on technical grounds, the FCC discussed the sexual content
of the speech in its opinions. The decisions sent a message to
licensees that vulgar or offensive speech might prompt special FCC
attention to technical violations. The FCC's licensing power is
enhanced by the judiciary's hesitation to intrude upon that power.
Traditionally courts require "only a showing that the Commission is
rational rather than arbitrary and capricious""' 9 and the Supreme
Court has approved broad interpretations of the public interest
standard, saying that the standard is "a broad one, a power 'not nig-
gardly but expansive,' . . .whose validity we have long upheld."'20
By leaving standards unclear, this judicial deference unquestionably
chills broadcast expression.
The Collective Standard
The non-broadcast, mainstream standard definitely puts obscene
material outside of the First Amendment and all other sexual
speech within it, using Miller v. California to identify obscene
material. The Court created this two-level, protected/not protected
speech model initially in Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire but Ginz-
burg, Ginsberg, and Young weakened the formerly rigid demarca-
tion. The broadcasting standard leaves obscenity, indecency, and
material contrary to the public interest open to control. Obscenity is
defined by standards peculiar to broadcasting; indecency is defined
by the standards of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, and the public in-
terest criterion operates without clear substantive standards.
Combined, the mainstream and broadcasting standards create a
collective standard that suggests, first, that the term "obscenity
119. Id. at 624.
120. Red Lion Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,380 (1969). citing National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943). Heretofore the FCC's
power to grant licenses has been used primarily "to promote greater diversity in the
broadcasting medium" rather than less. Writer's Guild of America, Inc., West v. FCC,
423 F.Supp. 1064, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 1976). For example, Red Lion and Brandywine-Main
Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973), both re-
quired stations to air something new (rebuttal to personal attack and anti-cigarette in-
formation, respectively) rather than deleting something. The public interest standard
was used, however, to proscribe cigarette advertising in Capital Broadcasting Co. v.
Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S 1000 (1972).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1980], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol14/iss2/2
OBSCENITY RECONSIDERED
law" is too narrow to encompass the scope of sexual material open
to control. Adding Pacifica Foundation's conclusion that the state
may sanction indecent language in broadcasting to Young's hint that
the state may sanction sexually explicit speech results in increased
potential control of sexual expression and warns that the rubric
"obscenity law" should be used only with the recognition that other
forms of sexual speech are also open to control. Second, the collec-
tive standard moots the scholarly debate over whether the Court is
pursuing a constant or variable obscenity approach. Commentators
regularly chart the Court's movements between constant and
variable obscenity.'21 Typically they proceed under the assumption
that constant obscenity is the norm and Ginsberg, Ginzburg and
Young the "exceptions."'" But Pacifica Foundation adds a fourth
essential exception. It effectively tilts the operating presumption to
show that variable obscenity, not constant obscenity, is the ruling
analysis and constant obscenity the exception. Pacifica Foundation
is a threshold decision that directs attention from a growing list of
"exceptions" to a reformulation of the original operating standard.
Finally, the collective standard advises a restatement of the
substantive standards under which sexual speech is controlled.
Miller v. California binds print and motion picture media while leav-
ing broadcast regulation unfettered. Broadcast material becomes
obscene at a lower threshold point than mainstream media and it
may be controlled even if it falls short of obscenity. The collec-
tive standard shows the short-sightedness of the claim that only
"hard-core" pornography may be censored constitutionally.'28 In fact,
because airwaves transmit a significant proportion of the total
speech heard in the country, much of the total expression conveyed
today falls under a singular set of standards. Over 97 percent of
American households own at least one television set and few are
unaware of the numerous hours spent watching television. 2' The
average child watches almost seven hours of television daily and
will, by the age of 16, have consumed up to 15,000 hours of televi-
sion." It is not an exaggeration to say that broadcasting transmits
more information, imparts more entertainment, elicits more trust,'26
121. See, e.g., the sources cited supra note 42.
122. See, e.g., Note, 61 VA. L. REV., supra note 8. at 589-91.
123. This was the Court's message in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 29 and
has provided the basis for conclusions of constitutional law scholars. See, e.g.,
SCHAUER, supra note 9, at 47-48.
124. Note, 27 STAN. L. REV., supra note 26, at 1548 n.91.
125. Id.
126. "[NJearly one-half of all adults consider television the most believable
news medium among newspapers, magazines, radio and television." Id.
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and captures more time of Americans than any other single medium.
The collective standard recognizes that obscenity standards take a
sudden dip when the utterances in question are transmitted via the
public airwaves. It advises that a significant portion of the total ex-
pression exchanged in this country falls under a regulatory pall
largely divorced from the supposedly definitive Miller standards of
obscenity.
PROCEDURAL STANDARDS GOVERNING THE CONTROL
OF SEXUAL SPEECH
The Mainstream Standard
A prior restraint bars expression before it is disseminated to
the public; a subsequent punishment controls speech after it has
been communicated. A prior restraint prevents speech from occur-
ring at all, a subsequent punishment allows the speech to be voiced
but penalizes the perpetrator after the fact.'" The Supreme Court
has long condemned prior restraints. In Near v. Minnesota Chief
Justice Hughes stated that "it has been generally, if not universally,
considered that it is the chief purpose of the [First Amendment]
guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication."'28 In
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, Chief Justice Burger similarly
declared that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the
most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights."'" Because prior restraints are forbidden only for First
Amendment speech the state may bar obscenity (unprotected
speech) before its distribution. But in order to avoid intruding on
protected sexual speech while quashing obscenity, the state must
follow proper procedures designed to protect First Amendment
speech.
The state controls obscenity by criminally prosecuting people
who produce or distribute obscenity, enjoining the distribution of
obscene material, and setting up censorship boards to screen
obscene material before it ever reaches the public. With the excep-
tion of the censorship of print material,"8 the Court upholds these
127. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 648
(1955).
128. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
129. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Court treats prior restraints as presumptively un-
constitutional. Chief Justice Burger said of New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971): "every member of the Court, tacitly or explicitly, accepted the Near [Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)] and Keefe [Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971)] condemnations of prior restraint as presumptively unconsti-
tutional." Pittsburgh Press v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 396 (1973).
130. See note 140 infra.
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sanctions as long as the state follows rigorous procedures in ex-
ecuting them."' For example, in criminal prosecutions the state must
follow proper procedures in seizing material for evidentiary pur-
poses. It must obtain a search warrant issued upon probable cause
by a neutral magistrate describing the material to be seized,182 and
one not worded in "conclusionary" terms,' and then must hold an
adversary hearing promptly after the seizure.1" If only one copy of
the item exists, such as one reel of film, the state must copy the
item quickly so that the material can be disseminated and the status
quo maintained1" pending a judicial determination.
The state may enjoin the publication and distribution of obscene
material only if a court promptly made the determination of
obscenity1" under a precisely drawn enabling statute."7 In Kinsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown" the Court upheld a New York statute that
authorized a municipal officer to bring action to enjoin the sale or
distribution of obscene material. The statute forbade restraint of the
material until after a court determined the material was obscene. It
mandated that the trial take place within one day after the attempted
injunction and the judicial determination take place two days
later, thereby keeping to a minimum the action's chilling effect on
speech.'
Licensing programs which allow a censor to screen material
before public exhibition are permissible for films, but not for the
print medium. ' The Court will not tolerate "informal" state
pressures on the print medium if their effect is to intimidate dis-
tributors into not making publications available. In Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan,' the Court struck down a commission's plan
131. See, e.g., Chief Justice Warran, dissenting in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 199 (1964). See also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
132. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
133. SCHAUER supra note 9, at 218, referring to Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia,
392 U.S. 636, 637 (1968).
134. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 490 (1973).
135. Id. at 492-93.
136. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
137. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1973).
138. 354 U.S. 436 (1967).
139. See also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60 (1965).
140. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of
Partial Regulation" of the Mass Media, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1976). See SCHAUER,
supra note 9, at 232: "any system of censorship for books or magazines would probably
be impermissible even if it did comply with Freedman." See also Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. at 60-61; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 n.10 (1963).
141. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
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to send letters to book distributors notifying them of books it had
found objectionable for youth, thanking them for their presumed
cooperation, and telling them the list of books would be sent to
police departments. Even though the commission had no formal
sanctioning powers, its methods threatened to inhibit distributors"'
and amounted to a prior restraint in effect if not name. The Court
concluded that the plan was censorship and struck it down because
it failed to comply with the rigid procedures necessary when expres-
sion is at stake. Among other things, it failed to provide for a notice
and a hearing to decide what was objectionable for children and
thus allowed the commission to act both as censor and judge. In con-
trast, the Court has upheld licensing programs for motion pictures.
In Times Film Corp. v. Chicago"' the Court upheld a city ordinance
requiring a censor to screen films for obscenity before their public
showing. The Court later explained that films differed from other
forms of expression. "' Films are scheduled long before they are
shown, giving adequate time for a judicial determination so that
films found not to be obscene may be advertised and shown as
scheduled. In Freedman v. Maryland"5 the Court said that film licen-
sing was constitutional if the state maintained the status quo bet-
ween the initial restraint and the judicial determination, provided
for prompt judicial review, and imposed restraints only through the
courts. A censorship board may not act doubly as censor and judge
and the burden of proof must rest upon the censorship board.
In summary, the Court's distrust of prior restraint led it to
develop stringent procedural standards governing the control of
obscenity. The Court's position is that erroneous restraint of pro-
tected speech in the course of trying to control unprotected utter-
ances irreversibly damages free expression. If the state wishes to
suppress obscene expression, it must not do so until a court decides
it is obscene. The state may review films before their initial showing
to identify possibly obscene material but it must wait until after dis-
tribution to bring action against possibly obscene print materials.
The Broadcasting Standard
The FCC controls sexuality in broadcasting through its power
142. See Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. at 67 n.8. Wrote the Court, "We
are not the first court to look through forms to the substance and recognize that infor-
mal censorship may sufficiently inhibit the circulation of publications to warrant in-
junctive relief." Id. at 67 (footnote omitted).
143. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
144. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 60-61.
145. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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over licensing 4" and its authority to impose monetary fines for the
broadcast of obscene or indecent language.' 7 There are also indica-
tions the FCC informally pressures stations into censoring
themselves.' The procedures attending the FCC's formal sanction-
ing power offer less protection to free speech than do those govern-
ing sanctions in other media. By its nature, informal FCC pressure
occurs in the absence of procedural safeguards.
1. Official Controls
The Communications Act requires stations to be relicensed
every three years. 9 The Act empowers the FCC to renew licenses if
it decides "public interest, convenience, or necessity would be
served thereby.""' It may deny a renewal or issue only a short-term
renewal if it concludes renewal would not benefit the public interest,
convenience, or necessity."' When the licensee applies for a renewal
at the end of the three-year period, the FCC may ask for a written
statement of why the renewal should be granted.'52 If the Commis-
sion has received complaints about programming content this re-
quest may become inquisitorial in tone. For example, in Palmetto
Broadcasting Corp."' the FCC notified the applicant of complaints
received about "vulgar and suggestive" programs and requested the
licensee to respond within 15 days. This placed the burden on the
licensee to show why the FCC should renew the license. This con-
trasts to the mainstream principle that the state must assume the
burden of showing why speech should be controlled. This effect is
mitigated only by the fact that if the FCC denies a license renewal
the station may then petition for a rehearing," during which time
the license must be held in effect.'
5
'
In cases of license revocation the FCC must launch an inquiry
and serve an order to the station stating the reasons for the inquiry,
requesting the recipient to show cause why such action should not
146. See note 109 supra.
147. 47 U.S.C. § 503 (b)(1)(E)(1976).
148. See text accompanying notes 175-191, infra.
149. 47 U.S.C. § 308 (d)(1976).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Palmetto Broadcasting Corp., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962), rehearing denied, 34
F.C.C. 101 (1963), aff'd sub. nom., Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
154. 47 U.S.C. § 308 (d)(1976), following the provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 405.
155. 47 U.S.C. § 308 (d)(1976).
19801
Bonnicksen: Obscenity Reconsidered: Bringing Broadcasting into the Mainstream
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
286 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 14
be taken, and stating the place and time (no less than 30 days later)
for the respondent to appear before the Commission.'" After the
respondent appears, the FCC issues an order stating the findings,
grounds, and effective date for its decision. This process places the
burden of proof on the FCC. However, it does not require that the
status quo be maintained between the initial order and the final
determination.
When the FCC fines a station for broadcasting obscene or inde-
cent language57 it must first issue a written Notice of Apparent
Liability specifying the "date, facts, and nature of the act . . . with
which the licensee ... is charged."'" This Notice must not be issued
more than one year after the utterances were aired.' Thirty days
after receiving the Notice the licensee may "show in writing . . .
why he should not be held liable.""' The process does not require
the status quo to be maintained between the Notice and the deter-
mination, nor does it provide for prompt judicial review after the 30
day period. "' Moreover, in practice the FCC has failed properly to
follow even these minimal procedures. Consider, for example, the
above-described Sonderling Corp.12 in which the FCC levied a $2000
fine against a radio station for broadcasting obscene language. Acting
in response to listener complaints, the FCC taped 60 hours of sex-
oriented talk shows aired over eight stations licensed to the Sonderling
Corporation in January and February of 1973. It then singled out
two shows and ordered a Notice of Apparent Liability to be drawn
up. The next day it launched a closed inquiry into the matter and
within a week publicly announced its inquiry. Two weeks later it
sent a Notice of Apparent Liability to Sonderling Corporation in
which it concluded that the broadcasts were obscene or indecent and
advised the corporation to pay the $2000 or contest the order in
court. The Sonderling Corporation accepted the conclusion and paid
the fine.
Two features of this procedure bear noting. First, as its name in-
dicates the Notice of Apparent Liability is meant to advise the reci-
156. 47 U.S.C. § 312 (c)(1976). The 30-day rule may be shortened if "safety of
life or property" is involved. Id.
157. See note 54 supra. The "fine" is a civil and not a criminal penalty, being a
forfeiture.
158. 47 U.S.C. § 503 (2)(1976).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 414
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
162. In re Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 RR2d 1508, recon. denied, 41
F.C.C.2d 777 (1973). See text accompanying notes 62-83 supra.
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pient merely that a charge of statutory violation has been made
against it." The notice specifies the "date, facts, and nature of the
act ... with which ... the licensee is charged."'" and gives the reci-
pient time to prepare a response.' However, the notice sent to
Sonderling "concluded" that the broadcasts were obscene or inde-
cent.'" This tactic not only undercut the Notice's statutory purpose,
but also put the FCC into the dual position of being censor and
judge inasmuch as the FCC both brought the action and decided the
outcome. Moreover, all of this was accomplished without the benefit
of a full hearing. These actions recalled those of a state commission
reviewed by the Supreme Court in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan.'
The censorship commission at issue in Sullivan sent notices to book
distributors listing publications objectionable for minors and warn-
ing of sanctions for noncooperation. The Court held that this had the
effect of a final judgment and amounted to censorship devoid of pro-
per procedures. One of the fatal defects of the plan was its failure to
provide a hearing determining that certain publications were objec-
tionable, thereby allowing the commission to act both as censor and
judge.'"
Second, the initial inquiry into the broadcasts was closed to the
public.' The FCC said it closed the inquiry to prevent the "chilling"
of speech during the course of the review.' However at least one
court has suggested that the closed inquiry "accentuated" the
chill,' presumably because it created uncertainty among broad-
casters. The closed inquiry would be analogous to grand jury
deliberations in a mainstream obscenity trial and would not raise
163. See Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 403
n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
164. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) (1976).
165. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2) (1976) states that after a licensee has received a
Notice of Apparent Liability it "shall be granted an opportunity to show in writing,
within such reasonable period as the Commission shall by regulations prescribe, why
he should not be held liable." If the licensee elects not to pay the proposed forfeiture it
is entitled to a trial de novo. 47 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1976).
166. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d at 401. As Chief
Judge Bazelon said in his statement why he voted to grant a rehearing en banc, the
Notice "reads like a decision and states conclusions." At 414.
167. 372 U.S. 58 (1963). See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC,
515 F.2d at 403.
168. 372 U.S. at 71.
169. Alleged Broadcasts and Cablecasts of Obscene, Indecent or Profane
Material, No. 73-331 (FCC March 27, 1973). See Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v.
FCC, 515 F.2d at 408 n.2.
170. Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 FCC2d 777, 783 n.17 (1973).
171. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d at 408 n.2.
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constitutional questions if leading only to a notice to the station that
charges were to be brought against it. But, as noted above, the
notice amounted to a judgment. In this case the inquiry was
analogous to a trial and thus required an open hearing.
Two citizens' groups, acting as representatives of the public,
contested the FCC's findings in Sonderling Corp. The circuit court
accepted the groups' standing to challenge the substantive issues at
bar'72 but it denied their standing to challenge the FCC's pro-
cedures.173 This left the FCC's questionable procedures intact. In
passing, however, the court pointed out some of the procedure's
weaknesses, including its similarity to the scheme struck down by
the Supreme Court in Bantam Books. 7 "
In summary, procedures governing the FCC's sanctioning
powers are not imbued with the same concern for the mistaken con-
trol of protected speech as are mainstream standards. In renewal
cases licensees must take the initiative in showing that their
licenses should be renewed. In revocation cases speech is suspended
during the appellate process. In at least one forfeiture case the FCC
reached a conclusion about a program in the absence of a full hear-
ing. Each case accepts procedures in broadcasting that would be
struck down in the mainstream media under Freedman v. Maryland
standards.
2. "Unofficial" Pressures
The FCC exerts informal as well as formal pressures on sta-
tions. In what Chief Judge Bazelon calls the "raised eyebrow" ap-
proach,'75 the FCC subtly lets radio and television licensees know its
reaction to certain programs. Anxious to avoid encounters with the
FCC, the licensees take these cues into account when planning their
programs. Until the FCC actions are recognized as formal policy the
Commission is free to exert them without procedural safeguards.
However, in a sign of new judicial watchfulness, one court has
equated informal pressures with formal policy, striking them for
procedural deficiencies."'
172. Id. at 403.
173. The court concluded that only the licensee could assert procedural errors.
Id., at 403.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 423.
176. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F.Supp. 1064 (1976). The
case is summarized infra, this section.
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The FCC's raised eyebrow tactics revolve around its power over
licensing. Licensing is the FCC's "ultimate regulatory tool." '177 It
gives the FCC "extraordinary bargaining power."'78 The FCC can ex-
ert considerable pressure over station programming by merely hin-
ting that it will revoke or deny a license. One way the FCC conveys
its views is through channeling audience complaints. When the FCC
receives a complaint, it informs the target station and in a cover let-
ter notes that the complaint will be kept on file for use at license
renewal time.7 9 There are signs that licensees take this threat
seriously when making programming decisions. 8" Second, the FCC
uses public speeches to convey its disapproval of programming con-
tent. For example, FCC Chairman Wiley pointed out in a speech to
the Illinois Broadcasters Association that broadcasters were account-
able to the public and had "'special' responsibilities as licensees."
He warned that "If self regulation [by the industry] does not work,
governmental action to protect the public may be re-
quired- whether you like it or whether I like it."'81 Similarly, former
FCC chairman Dean Burch gave a vitriolic speech before the Na-
tional- Association of Broadcasters (NAB) shortly after the FCC an-
nounced its inquiry into the Sonderling case. Burch attacked the
"prurient trash that is the stock-in-trade of the sex-oriented radio
talk show, complete with the suggestive, coaxing, pear-shaped tones
of the smut-hustling host" and brusquely warned that "the price
may be high" if broadcasters fail to deal with the "problem"'82 He
expressed his hope that the inquiry into the Sonderling broadcasts
would "make further government action [to control sex in program-
ming] moot."'' 1 Soon after, radio stations sharply cut sexual discus-
sion on the air. '"
Third, the FCC confers directly with broadcasting represen-
tatives. It did this in its recent effort to create a family viewing
policy for television.' Responding to Congressional concern about
the harmful effects of television programs on children, the FCC
studied ways of resolving the problem.' It decided upon a "channel-
177. Id. at 1147.
178. Note, 61 VA. L. REV., supra note 8, at 611.
179. Id. at 606, 611. See note 92 supra.
180. The FCC's letter policy "probably exceeds the Supreme Court limits more
than the reported case law indicates." Note, 61 VA. L. REV., supra note 8, at 609, 611.
181. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F.Supp. at 1098.
182. Quoted in Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d at
408.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 409.
185. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F.Supp. 1064 (1976).
186. Id. at 1096-97.
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ing" policy which would send violent or sexual programs to late
evening hours and restrict them during the early evening when a
"family viewing hour" would prevail. Because the FCC could not
legally order the family viewing hour, it instead "encouraged" the
broadcasting industry to regulate itself..7 through, among other
things, threats issued in speeches and meetings with network ex-
ecutives and NAB representatives.'" Following one series of
meetings the NAB Television Code Review Board amended the NAB
Television Code to set up a family viewing policy that forbade sex
and violence in early evening shows." The Writers Guild of
America, West, Inc. and other groups aepresenting writers, actors,
directors and producers brought suit against the FCC, NAB, and the
CBS, ABC and NBC television networks. They contended, inter alia,
that the FCC pressured the networks and NAB to censor television
in violation of the First Amendment and the Communications Act's
anti-censorship guarantee. The U.S. District Court agreed, holding
that "the family viewing policy was adopted by the networks and
the broadcasting association pursuant to threats from the FCC; [and]
that the actions on the part of both the FCC and the broadcasters
violated the First Amendment."' " Reviewing extensive testimonial
exhibits, the court concluded that the "Commission exerted im-
proper pressure, that the networks improperly considered that
pressure in making programming judgments, and that the defend-
ants combined in an effort to compromise the independent
judgments of broadcast licensees through the medium of the
NAB." 19 1
The Collective Standard
The collective standard shows that courts evince a graduated
187. Said FCC Chairman Wiley," . . . I feel that self-regulation is to be pre-
ferred over the adoption of inflexible governmental rules." Report on Broadcast of
Violent, Indecent and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418, 419 n.5 (1975).
188. For example, it was suggested at one meeting that licensees could state
their policy on violence and sex when returning licensing renewal forms to the FCC, a
move that would pair licensing renewal with the presence of a network policy. Writers
Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F.Supp. 1064, 1100-01. For a summary of
these meetings, see ict at 1092-1128.
189. As stated in NAB, The Television Code 2-3 (18 ed. June 1975) (from
Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F.Supp. at 1072): "Entertainment
programming inappropriate for viewing by a general family audience should not be
broadcast during the first hour of network entertainment programming in prime time
and in the immediately preceding hour. In the occasional case when an entertainment
is deemed to be inappropriate for such an audience, advisories should be used to alert
viewers."
190. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F.Supp. at 1154-55.
191. Id., at 1073.
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concern for prior restraint despite the Court's reproval of such
restraints. Concern is greatest for print materials. There the state
must allow suspicious material to be distributed before sanctioning
it. Punishment may follow only if a court determines the material was
obscene. The judicial review is quick, and the material in question is
freely distributed pending the judicial decision. Films engender less
concern given the Court's willingness to allow the state to screen films
prior to their distribution. However, the determination of obscenity
must be made judicially without delay and the status quo must be
maintained pending the judicial decision. Screening is permissible for
films, the Court holds, because films are booked in advance and may be
screened before their scheduled showing.
The Supreme Court has not set down procedures for broad-
cast censorship, and FCC and lower court case law is undeveloped.
The few pertinent decisions on the books show less concern over
prior restraint than do Supreme Court decisions involving other
forms of expression. The FCC has reached decisions in the absence
of full hearings and explicitly drawn statutes. It also informally
pressures licensees by, among other things, associating complaints
with the station's file and warning that it will review the complaints
at license renewal time. This warning threatens to turn audience
complaints into final decisions. Informed of complaints on file, the
sage licensee will avoid airing similar material. So-called self-
censorship is actually a prior restraint if done out of fear of implied
punishment. The lax standards governing the control of sexual
speech in broadcasting function without a compelling reason. It is
one thing to say that the unique substantive standards ought to apply
to broadcasting because of its nature. It is another thing to say that
broadcasting's idiosyncracies justify different procedural standards.
A strong First Amendment requires procedural controls whenever
speech is at issue, regardless of the mode of conveyance. To dilute
procedural controls without a compelling reason is to strike a double
blow at broadcasting.
Second, the collective standard bids commentators not to con-
clude that the Freedman standards govern the control of sexual
speech. In fact a large body of speech-that broadcast over the air-
waves-is controlled under procedures less stringent than those in
Freedman. Even though the Supreme Court has not ruled on the con-
stitutionality of broadcast procedures in sexual speech cases, FCC
case law is binding and must be considered in order accurately to
assess the status of sexual speech.
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CONCLUSION
Broadcasting cannot justifiably be excluded from obscenity
analysis. Words and ideas distributed over the airwaves are no less
speech than words and ideas transmitted through the print and mo-
tion picture media. Broadcasting's idiosyncracies may justify impos-
ing different standards on the medium but they do not justify
overlooking the medium when analyzing sexual speech in the coun-
try today.
This article outlined substantive standards governing the con-
trol of sexual speech in the mainstream media and in broadcasting
and then combined the two in a collective standard. It did the same
for procedural standards. The collective standard simply states
guidelines governing all media taken together. It counterbalances
the tendency of commentators to separate the study of the main-
stream and broadcast media. The label would be unnecessary were
all media studied together as a matter of course.
The incorporation of broadcasting into traditional obscenity
analysis compels revisions in the doctrine of sexual speech, as
repeatedly described in the article. It also affects the broader doc-
trine of free expression. First, it points to a system of gradations
within the First Amendment based upon media. The substantive
standard of sexual speech is two-pronged: it offers one formula for
films and the print medium and another for broadcasting. The pro-
cedural standard is tripartite: it offers one formula for the print
medium, a second for films, and a third for broadcasting. Moreover,
the Court distinguishes between types of sexual speech. Whereas it
once distinguished merely between obscene and nonobscene speech
with the Chaplinsky-Roth two-level principle, it now allows that
distinction to fluctuate with the variable obscenity approach, it
allows the control of indecent speech in broadcasting, and it allows
the distinction between indecent and decent speech to fluctuate in
the variable indecency approach. In short, the Court has replaced
constant obscenity with variable obscenity and variable indecency.
All of these gradations contrast with the Court's tendency to reduce
other First Amendment gradations such as those between commer-
cial and non-commercial speech and between symbolic and verbal
speech.
Second, to include broadcasting is to reveal fissures in two sup-
posed pillars of First Amendment doctrine: vigilance against prior
restraint. 2 and the chilling of speech.19 Absent a compelling reason,
192. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
193. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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the FCC and lower courts have diluted controls over prior restraint
in broadcasting. Also, by failing to construe the public interest
criterion precisely they allow the FCC, in the exercise of its licens-
ing authority, to control the fate of broadcasters amid vague standards
that can only chill speech. It is questionable whether broadcasting is
so different as to justify encroachments on these cornerstones of
First Amendment law.
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